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Southeastern peanut farms with diversified field crops utilize government 
payments to supplement market receipts. Production in 2002 represented growing 
conditions under adverse weather, while 2003 represented optimal conditions. 
Representative farm analysis provides insight into allocation of market receipts and 
government payments for meeting variable costs and fixed costs. 
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Government Payments: Economic Impact on Southeastern Peanut Farms  
 
Support of commodity prices and farm income has been an objective of U.S. 
agricultural policy since the 1930s. While beneficial for farmers and rural communities, 
subsidies have lead to issues related to distortion of market signals through imbalances in 
price and production equilibrium. Commodity programs that link payments to current 
prices and production provide an incentive for producers to receive more payments by 
producing larger quantities of subsidized commodities. It follows that such linkages 
encourage farms to realize economies of size by increasing acreage per farm unit (USDA, 
ERS 2004b). 
The 2002 Farm Act continued and expanded provisions of the 1996 Farm Act to 
increase market orientation of U.S. program crops by decreasing linkages with payments 
and the relationship of prices and production levels. Peanuts were added to the group of 
field crops covered by commodity programs, eliminating production limitations and 
market price supports. Direct payments (DP) for program crops in the 2002 Farm 
Security and Rural Investment (FSRI) Act are completely decoupled from current prices 
and farm production. Payments are fixed and determined by historical acreage and yields 
with no decision by a farmer having a possibility to alter payment levels (USDA, ERS 
2003b). Countercyclical payments (CCP) are fixed and determined similarly to direct 
payments, but payment is triggered when prevailing commodity prices are below a target 
price. As in the case for direct payments, individual farmer decisions do not alter 
countercyclical payment levels to the farm unit (USDA, ERS 2002a). A third source of 
payments for program crops is from the marketing loan program. Instead of receiving   4
marketing loan financial benefits, farmers may elect to receive benefits in the form of 
loan deficiency payments (LDP) that are determined by farm production and a payment 
rate that is based upon the difference between market price and the established loan rate 
(USDA, ERS 2004a). Consequently, LDP receipts have linkage between prices and 
production with payment levels increasing as farm production increases.  
Domestic agricultural policy is increasingly subject to restrictions imposed by 
trade agreements between the U.S. and World Trade Organization (WTO) members. 
Compliance with many trade agreements are subject to member interpretation and 
disputes focus on whether or not a member’s policy is categorized as least trade distorting 
(green box support) or most trade distorting (amber box support). Current U.S. policy 
does not include payments that are included in blue box support. Green box payments 
must have little or minimal trade distorting effects on production. There is no clear 
definition of “minimal” and many criteria for green box inclusion are subject to 
interpretation. Categorization into green box or amber box support is important because 
all amber box support is included in the aggregate measure of support (AMS) allocated to 
WTO members. Green box support has no limitations subject to AMS commitment levels 
(USDA, ERS 2002b).  
Evaluation of U.S. agricultural programs involves aspects of achieving national 
priorities, as well as complying with trade agreements. One provision of FSRI is to 
maintain economic growth and infrastructure development in rural America (USDA, ERS 
2003a). A desirable policy objective is to support rural economies while allowing for 
local market adjustments which indicate economic efficiency.  Due to their composition, 
financial enhancement of rural economies generally involves support of farm income.   5
Multiplier effects that begin with farms, lead to impacts on suppliers, equipment dealers, 
service providers, and both agribusiness and general retailers. Financial soundness in all 
of these realms solidifies local tax bases that enable rural communities to achieve 
economic and social vitality.  
Farm level analysis indicates the efficacy of agricultural policy in supporting farm 
income while demonstrating whether tendencies of individual farm units are to follow 
production practices that are not trade distorting. Evaluation of representative farms 
simulates outcomes for a range of market prices and realized yields under prevailing 
policies. Alternative policies may be evaluated, including exclusion of all commodity 
support, for determination of farm level impacts. Farm level impacts inform policy 
makers as to likely ramifications for rural communities where agribusinesses are 
important to local economies. 
The purpose of this study is to evaluate current agricultural policy for peanut 
farms as established under FSRI. Peanut farms typically include rotation crops that are 
covered by commodity programs that are fundamentally similar. Thus, analysis of 
representative peanut farms provides a means to evaluate the entirety of policy for U.S. 
program crops. Specific objectives include determining levels of income support and 
potential consequences for trade distortions caused by artificially stimulating production.  
 
Representative Farms 
The National Center for Peanut Competitiveness (NCPC) has developed 
representative southeastern peanut farms for analyzing impacts of potential adoption of 
alternative production technologies, environmental regulations, water usage, and other   6
changes related to peanut production. Each farm is developed by a panel of 
approximately six producers in a geographical location who have similar farm size and 
production practices. Panel members participate in focus group type interviews to reach a 
consensus representative farm for an area. Data for each representative farm is compiled 
in the form of budgeted operating costs for individual crops, while fixed costs are 
itemized components of a farm total. Farm costs are updated every second year with 
yields and commodity prices updated annually. Revenue for a farm includes market 
receipts, DP, CCP, LDP, and insurance indemnity payments. Confidentiality of 
representative farm data is maintained so that no farm may be potentially identified by 
acreage, location, or crop mix.  
Five farms are included for this study with yields and prices for production years 
2002 and 2003. Most acreage on the representative peanut farms is devoted to cotton as a 
rotation crop. Poor weather conditions negatively impacted yields for both peanuts and 
cotton in 2002, while cotton experienced extremely low prices. Improved yields and 
prices in 2003 make possible a comparison in representative farms under unfavorable 
conditions in 2002 and more favorable conditions in 2003.  
Average acreage in program crops is 1547 acres, including an average of 100 
acres in double cropped wheat. Peanut farms average 445 acres in peanuts and 850 acres 
in cotton. There is an average of 152 acres planted in corn. Some farms have additional 
acreage for vegetables, hay, pasture, or livestock and poultry. Average irrigated acreage 
is 874 acres, or 56 percent of total program crop acreage. 
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Empirical Model 
Data for five representative farms includes variable costs per acre and total farm 
fixed costs for one year, as well as acreage with yields and prices received for two years. 
Confidentiality restrictions do not permit reporting of research results by individual 
representative farm. Reporting of results for a composite farm provides analysis for 
Southeastern peanut farms while maintaining confidentiality. Fixed costs are first 
computed as a weighted average per acre and estimated for an assumed composite farm 
with 1400 acres. Variable costs, prices, and yields are a composite of the five 
representative farms. Irrigated acreage for the composite farm consists of 54 percent of 
peanut acreage and 48 percent of cotton acreage.  
Application of an optimization model allows for sensitivity analysis by changing 
composite farm variables, and outcomes depict farm level decision making. A linear 
programming (LP) model for a composite farm is specified as: 
(1)      F
i
i C i G i R NR − ∑ − + = max , 
where NR is net returns maximized, R is receipts for crop i, G is government payments 
received, C is operating costs, and F is fixed costs for the farm. In addition to the 
irrigation limits previously stated, other constraints imposed by harvesting equipment 
limitations include no more than 400 acres of peanuts and 800 acres of cotton. Corn and 
wheat are custom harvested and are limited to 150 acres and 100 acres, respectively, due 
to observed acreage for the representative farms. 
Operating costs per acre are reported for 2002 in Table 1, and adjustments for 
2003 costs are based on FAPRI (2003) projections for each crop. Operating costs for 
2003 reflect increases over 2002 of 1.026 percent for peanuts, 1.011 percent for cotton,   8
1.026 percent for corn, and 1.028 percent for wheat. Fixed costs for 2003 are estimated 
from FLIPSIM (Richardson et al., Richardson and Nixon). Labor, repairs, and land rent 
are reported as “lumpy” expenditures and are included as fixed costs. Yields and prices 
are reported each year for the representative farms and are presented in Table 2, along 
with LDP rates calculated by FLIPSIM (Richardson, et al., Richardson and Nixon). 
Cotton prices for 2002 and 2003 include revenue from selling cotton seed after 
deductions for marketing expenses. Table 2 includes expected yields calculated from ten 
years of historical data from the representative farms. Expected prices are averages from 
5 years (2005-2009) of FAPRI (2004) forecasts with expected LDP rates calculated based 
on expected prices. Value of cottonseed sold net of marketing costs is derived from 
prevailing prices and costs (UGA).  
 R and C in Equation (1) enter into the optimization model on a per acre basis and 
represent variables for farmer decision making.  F is determined by reports that form the 
representative farms and is constant for each farm. G has three components with only 
LDP representing a parameter for decision making. In addition to LDP, G includes DP 
and CCP. Calculation of DP is     
(2)     85 0 BA PY PR DP . × × × = . 
PR is the payment rate that is constant and established by FSRI, and PY (payment yield), 
as well as BA (base acres) are determined by historical farm data that establish constant 
parameters. Calculation of CCP is identical to DP except that the payment rate for CCP 
is not fixed, but varies with commodity price. Payment rate for CCP is  
(3)    )} , max( , max{ LR P direct PR TP 0 PR − − = .   9
PRdirect is from Equation (2), TP is a target price, and LR is a loan rate, all three of which 
are constant and established by FSRI. Market price of the commodity is P, indicating that 
CCP varies only with price and a minus sign signifies an inverse relationship. For the 
representative farms, DP and CCP are calculated based on reported base acreages and 
yields, with CCP incorporating relevant market price levels.  
An alternative provision in programs for marketing assistant loans is an LDP. 
Instead of putting commodities in storage for later loan repayment, a farmer may choose 
to receive benefits directly when marketing the commodity. Rates for LDP are 
determined by shortfalls in P that result when either the posted county price or the 
prevailing world price is below the loan rate. Loan rates for LDP calculation are identical 
to LR in Equation (3). Marketing loan gains from crops under loan are equivalent to gains 
from the LDP alternative. All quantities marketed are eligible for LDP and total receipts 
increase with production.   
Total revenue (TR) for a crop in Equation (1) is given by the summation of market 
receipts (R), loan deficiency payment receipts (LDPreceipts), direct payments, and 
countercyclical payments or  
(4)    CCP DP Q LDP Q P TR + + × + × = ) ( ) ( , 
where Q is quantity produced. Farmer decision making is determined by marginal 
revenue analysis that is given by 


























With Equations (2) and (3) indicating that  
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production only changes total revenue through market prices and LDP rates. Provisions 
of current policy allow for receipt of direct payments and countercyclical payments as 
long as base acreage remains in agricultural usage, including fallow. There are no 
requirements to maintain production of any crop, including crops for which the payments 
are based. Thus, direct payments and countercyclical payments preserve farm acreage 
without artificially stimulating production in an attempt to increase revenue. 
 
Results and Implications 
Optimized acreage allocations for each year are identical and are presented in 
Table 2. Financial values for the composite farm are presented in Table 3. Returns are to 
operating costs and include other farm returns, as well as insurance indemnities paid. Net 
Returns do not include opportunity costs for management or owned land. Government 
payments are much greater in 2002 than 2003 due to depressed commodity prices in 
2002. Farm revenue from LDP is insignificant in 2003, and CCP in 2003 are over 50 
percent less than in 2002 due to improved commodity prices in 2003.  Direct payments 
are fixed annually. Results for program crops are presented on a per acre basis in Table 4. 
Returns by crop in Table 5 show irrigated peanuts to have the greatest value per 
acre in each year. Nonirrigated peanuts are slightly lower than irrigated cotton in each 
year, but expected returns for nonirrigated peanuts are greater than for irrigated cotton. 
Conditions in 2002 caused nonirrigated cotton to have negative net returns, while 
nonirrigated peanuts realized a return of $155 per acre. Returns for corn and wheat 
include expenses for custom harvesting.   11
Comparisons with yields and prices from 2002 and 2003 show farm program 
impacts in years of extreme pessimism and optimism. Representative farm data not only 
includes realized yields for each year, but also includes expected yields that represent a 
typical production year. Specifying composite farms with expected yields and prices 
presents a generalized analysis at the farm level that indicates long term impacts of 
commodity programs. Expected acreage allocation from LP analysis does not change 
from the annually optimized allocations in Table 2. 
Returns for expected yields and prices in Table 3 are lower than 2003 levels, but 
greater than 2002. Direct payments and countercyclical payments are not affected by 
production as indicated by Equation (6). Expected receipts from CCP are less than 2002 
because of low commodity prices in 2002. Net returns for expected yields and prices are 
66 percent of the level for 2003 yields and prices, but over 4 times the 2002 level. 
Comparisons in Table 3 show consequences on net returns of no support from 
government programs. Net returns are positive with 2003 yields and prices in Table 3, but 
deducting opportunity costs for unpaid farmer labor, management, and owned land would 
result in levels less than is reported for net returns less government payments. In contrast, 
2002 yields and prices lead to negative net returns without government payments, and 
total losses would be greater after deducting opportunity costs. Expected net return 
results shows improvement over 2002 results, but is negative without benefit of 
government payments. Returns from commodity program crops and payments for 
expected yields and prices are presented on a per acre basis in Table 4. 
Expected results in Table 3 depict long term outcomes and benefits of crop 
programs for southeastern peanut farms under current U.S agricultural policy. Expected   12
net returns of $115,828 appear adequate to maintain viable enterprises that support 
agribusinesses and local economies. Results for years having depressed prices and yields 
such as 2002 in Table 3 show that commodity programs prevent undesirable outcomes 
that would predictably lead to financial hardships throughout rural economies. 
Estimating returns to management as 5% of operating costs (UGA) leads to a 
$50,231 charge to management. Weighted portion of owned land is 32% of all land, and 
applying a $40 per acre charge (USDA, NASS) as an opportunity cost results in a total 
charge of $16,453. Adding interest charges paid by the farm leads to derivation of return 
to assets at 4.6% for expected yields and prices (Kay and Edwards). 
Further analysis of Table 3 provides insight into how government payments are 
distributed within farm enterprises. Annual fixed costs in 2002 are $386,643 and 
$352,633 for 2003. Positive expected returns indicate that market prices cover operating 
costs of crop production, even after subtracting LDP payments. However, returns with 
expected yields and prices are not sufficient to cover fixed costs, with shortfalls 
increasing after inclusion of opportunity costs for unpaid farmer management and owned 
land. Thus, government payments provide necessary income to enable a farm to acquire 
modern equipment, keep land in agriculture and maintain values (Flanders, White, and 
Escalante), provide incentives for proper management, and cover overhead costs.  
Although covering variable costs maintains production viability in the short term, 
returns that include LDP are not sufficient to cover total costs that would lead to 
incentives for farm expansion. Direct payments and countercyclical payments are 
necessary for long term success of farms. Since these two payments have fixed bases and   13
do not increase with production, the total effect of U.S. commodity programs does not 




Agricultural commodity programs are intended to support farm income while not 
distorting market signals that lead to overproduction. Existing provisions provide direct 
payments that are not linked to either production or commodity prices. Countercyclical 
payments are linked to commodity prices, but payments do not increase with production 
levels. Loan deficiency payments are based on rates determined by commodity prices and 
receipts increase as production increases.  
Compliance with world trade agreements is a consideration when implementing 
commodity programs. Programs that have little or no trade distorting elements are not 
subject to limitations. Aggregate limits are imposed on programs that have elements that 
are trade distorting. From a domestic perspective, programs that are trade distorting under 
trade agreement rules could lead to inefficiencies for U.S. agriculture. 
Southeastern peanut farms produce a mix of crops that enable a general evaluation 
of U.S. agricultural policy. Typical crops besides peanuts are cotton, corn, and wheat, and 
each of these crops have similar provisions under current policy. A composite farm with 
all four crops and returns from other farm production is applied in a linear programming 
analysis.  
Results show that peanut farms typically cover operating costs from market 
receipts, but fixed costs are only met with supplementation from government payments.   14
Direct payments and countercyclical payments are limited by base acreages and yields, 
providing no incentive for increased payments through increased production. Loan 
deficiency payments increase with production, but are not sufficient to stimulate 
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Table 1. Operating Costs per Acre and Fixed 







Fixed Costs 2002 $386,643






















2, and Optimized Acreage
-2002- -2003- -Expected-
Yield Price LDP Yield Price LDP Yield Price LDP Acres
Irrigated Peanuts 3,877 $368 $29.97 4,314 $380 $0 4,072 $396 $0.000 216
NonIrrigated Peanuts 1,996 $368 $29.97 2,851 $380 $0 2,655 $396 $0.000 184
Irrigated Cotton 985 $0.417 $0.121 1,027 $0.650 $0.003 974 $0.547 $0.000 373
NonIrrigated Cotton 323 $0.417 $0.121 746 $0.650 $0.003 620 $0.547 $0.000 427
Irrigated Corn 159 $2.44 $0 180 $2.16 $0 174 $2.34 $0.000 100
Irrigated Wheat 65 $3.07 $0 73 $3.16 $0.039 72 $3.24 $0.000 100
1Units per acre: peanuts and cotton = lbs.; corn and wheat = bu.
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Table 3. Returns and Government Payments
2002 2003 Expected
Returns $230,854 $410,651 $314,210
DP $55,165 $55,165 $55,165
CCP $125,696 $62,315 $99,086
Fixed Costs $386,643 $352,633 $352,633
Net Returns $25,072 $175,498 $115,828
LDP $61,243 $2,386 $0
Govt. Payments $242,104 $119,866 $154,251
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Table 4. Returns from Program Crops, Government Payments, per Acre 
2002 2003 Expected
Returns $124 $267 $195
DP $39 $39 $39
CCP $90 $45 $71
Fixed Costs $276 $252 $252
Net Returns $18 $125 $83
LDP $44 $2 $0
Govt. Payments $173 $86 $110
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Table 5. Returns per Acre, by Crop
2002 2003 Expected
Irrigated Peanuts $393 $425 $394
NonIrrigated Peanuts $155 $282 $255
Irrigated Cotton $160 $293 $191
NonIrrigated Cotton -$35 $241 $120
Irrigated Corn $103 $92 $110
Irrigated Wheat $55 $81 $77
Total $124 $267 $195  